The Feeling Type, as treated across the depth-psychology corpus, is far more contested and nuanced a category than popular understanding allows. Jung’s foundational taxonomy in Psychological Types establishes feeling as a rational function — a process of evaluative orientation that assigns value rather than merely registering emotion — and designates the feeling type as one whose dominant mode of adaptation proceeds through this evaluative faculty. Von Franz and Hillman, in their Lectures on Jung’s Typology, substantially complicate this picture: they dismantle sentimental clichés about the type’s presumed warmth and relational virtue, demonstrating that differentiated feeling can be manipulative, spiritually flattening, and resistant to intellectual development. Hillman’s contribution in particular presses the distinction between the feeling function and eros, between human evaluative consciousness and archetypal compulsion, insisting that feeling is an instrument of awareness rather than a divine force. The corpus also attends with care to the introverted and extraverted variants, to the feeling type’s characteristic inferior thinking, and to the developmental pathologies that attend undifferentiated feeling — including the doctrinaire rigidity, emotional inflation, and omnipotence fantasies that characterize the inferior pole. Beebe, Quenk, and Sharp each extend these concerns into typological dynamics and practical clinical observation. Taken together, these voices reveal a type defined not by sentiment but by the capacity — and its frequent failure — for differentiated valuation.