Within the depth-psychology corpus, ‘examination’ operates on at least three distinct registers that the careful reader must disentangle. First, there is the clinical-diagnostic sense: the structured assessment of symptoms, whether through Janet’s objective neurological procedures, Jung’s association experiments, or the psychophysical protocols of galvanometric research. Here examination names the investigator’s penetrating gaze directed outward at the patient. Second, and psychodynamically richer, is the internalized examination — the scene of judgment that Freud identifies in anxiety-dreams about failing school tests, where the dreamer’s childhood fear of punishment returns as somatic dread whenever adult conduct falls short. This oneiric examination-anxiety reveals the superego’s relentless tribunal operating beneath waking life. Third, the corpus preserves a contemplative-philosophical current in which examination turns inward: Petrarch’s writing as self-examination and self-cultivation, the I Ching’s counsel that superior persons examine themselves when halted, and Posidonius’s insistence that the examination of emotions is foundational to all ethics. The tension between these registers — examination as external diagnostic tool versus examination as interior ethical practice — gives the term its productive instability across the tradition, linking clinical method to the examined life and anxiety to conscience.