Within the depth-psychology corpus, drowsiness occupies a liminal position at the threshold between waking consciousness and the unconscious — a threshold that is simultaneously a methodological problem, a psychological phenomenon, and, in certain traditions, a site of spiritual significance. Jung’s early experimental work treats morning drowsiness as a measurable perturbation of associative function, demonstrating that it disrupts attention more severely than external distraction and thereby reveals the architecture of unconscious complexes with unusual clarity. Von Franz extends this experimental logic into the clinical and fairy-tale register, arguing that drowsiness is not merely a physiological state but a contagious psychic condition emanating from the patient’s unconscious resistance; the analyst who ‘falls asleep’ to the problem has been, in her vocabulary, ‘bewitched.’ James notes that drowsiness, alongside illness and fatigue, narrows the field of consciousness almost to a point, reducing its usual wide apprehension of relational truths. Outside the strictly analytic tradition, Eastern commentaries treat the tendency to doze during meditation as the inertia of tamas, a gravitational pull back toward unconsciousness that the practitioner must actively overcome. Medical-pharmacological literature in the corpus treats drowsiness as an adverse event profile associated with baclofen and other agents, a usage that stands entirely outside the psychological debate but documents the term’s empirical presence. The central tension across these positions is whether drowsiness is a deficit to be overcome or a revelatory border state.