Destructiveness occupies a contested and generative position across the depth-psychology corpus, resisting both moralistic dismissal and naive biologism. Erich Fromm offers the most systematic treatment, grounding destructiveness not in innate aggression but in the thwarting of life itself: where spontaneity, growth, and expression are blocked, libidinal energy reverses into destructive force. This formulation—‘destructiveness is the outcome of unlived life’—stands as a thesis against which other voices are measured. Guggenbuhl-Craig challenges sociological ‘futurism’ that imagines destructiveness eradicable through political reform, insisting instead on its shadow-archetypal permanence. Winnicott repositions the question developmentally: the capacity to be destructive and survive the object’s counter-response is constitutive of genuine object-relating and thus of psychological depth. Hillman, characteristically, aestheticizes the problem, finding in analysis itself a necessarily destructive moment—soul-making requires soul-destroying—while also tracing puer and hero self-destructiveness to specific archetypal deficits. Horney localizes self-destructiveness within neurotic self-hate, cataloguing its somatic and phantasmatic expressions. Kalsched brings Winnicott’s destruction-and-survival sequence to bear on trauma theory. Together these voices reveal destructiveness as structurally ambivalent: simultaneously a defence, a symptom, a developmental necessity, and an irreducible shadow-datum of human existence.