Catalepsy occupies a contested and illuminating position within the depth-psychology corpus, appearing at the intersection of somatic symptomatology, dissociative theory, and the evolutionary biology of immobility. Bleuler, writing in 1911, furnishes the most sustained clinical account, situating catalepsy—alongside flexibilitas cerea and command-automatism—as an accessory symptom of schizophrenia whose psychic determinants resist final resolution. He insists that suggestion in the ordinary sense cannot account for the phenomenon, while acknowledging that abrupt positional impositions on the patient’s limb may function as a quasi-suggestive trigger. Bleuler’s index entries further link catalepsy to crimes committed in its state and to hypnoid forms, attesting to its medicolegal and phenomenological reach. Janet classifies catalepsy as a form of somnambulism, anchoring it to the hysterical field and to the dissociative narrowing of the field of consciousness. Hillman, approaching from archetypal psychology, notes that the Greek term has been in circulation since antiquity—unlike twentieth-century coinages such as ‘schizophrenia’—thereby reminding the reader that the phenomenon precedes its diagnostic framing. Levine, from a somatic-trauma perspective, links tonic immobility directly to the evolutionary underpinnings of catalepsy and catatonia, connecting Kahlbaum’s original 1874 observations to contemporary PTSD theory. The term thus traverses classical psychiatry, hysteria studies, Jungian index literature, and trauma neuroscience.