Buddhism occupies a richly contested terrain within the depth-psychology corpus. It enters the literature along several distinct vectors: as a soteriological system whose diagnosis of suffering anticipates and rivals psychotherapy (Brazier, Epstein, Welwood), as a contemplative tradition whose epistemological resources—particularly concerning the constructed, ego-dependent nature of mind—afford productive comparison with analytic and object-relational frameworks (Clarke, Spiegelman, Cooper), and as a living religious civilization whose Tibetan, Zen, and Mahayana branches each generate distinct interpretive encounters with Western psychology (Evans-Wentz, Suzuki, Govinda). Jung’s relationship to Buddhism is paradigmatic: Clarke documents his acknowledged debt to Buddhist teachings in treating psychic suffering, while simultaneously tracing Jung’s resistance to full identification with Eastern non-dual goals. Campbell reads Buddhism mythologically, situating its Hinayana and Mahayana streams within the cross-cultural hero-and-savior complex. Brazier and Epstein press more clinical claims, arguing that Buddhist phenomenology—particularly bare attention, impermanence, and the dissolution of the narrative self—provides correctives to Western therapeutic blind spots. A persistent tension runs through the corpus between Buddhism as universal psychology of liberation and Buddhism as culturally particular tradition, a tension that organizes much of the dialogue between East and West in this literature.