The term ‘bottom’ occupies a remarkably plural space within the depth-psychology corpus, functioning simultaneously as a clinical threshold, a phenomenological marker, and an epistemological principle. In the recovery literature — most fully elaborated in the ACA World Service Organization’s compendium and amplified by Flores and Kurtz — ‘bottom’ designates the nadir of dysfunction at which the psyche’s defenses finally yield to the necessity of change. The concept is clinically stratified: ‘high-bottom’ and ‘low-bottom’ drinkers mark opposite poles of severity, while ‘camouflaged bottoms’ — panic attacks, dissociative emptiness, relational collapse — complicate any simple catastrophist reading. Crucially, the ACA literature insists that apparent resilience can itself constitute a form of acting out, perpetually deferring the genuine bottom. A second, neurologically grounded deployment of the term appears in somatic and trauma therapies (Levine, Ogden, Winhall), where ‘bottom-up processing’ — sensation preceding cognition — stands as the corrective to Cartesian top-down models. Hillman, characteristically, politicizes the figure: ‘bottom-line’ thinking names the reductive gravitational pull of materialist economics on the ascensionist spirit. Across all these registers, the ‘bottom’ is never merely a low point; it is the site where transformation becomes unavoidable.