Autism occupies a strikingly diverse terrain across the depth-psychology corpus, appearing as a clinical diagnostic category, a neurological model, a developmental stage, a symbolic constellation, and a comorbid condition requiring specialized clinical attention. The range of positions is considerable. Bleuler introduced the term within his foundational schizophrenia taxonomy, and traces of this genealogy persist throughout the literature. Liz Greene approaches autism as an expression of fate — a condition through which astrological and mythological forces manifest in individual biography, treating the autistic adult as a carrier of transpersonal necessity. McGilchrist, whose contributions are the most sustained, argues that autism must be understood as a right-hemisphere deficit syndrome, mapping its characteristic impairments — failures of gaze following, joint attention, empathy, theory of mind, intersubjectivity, and narrative self — onto a coherent neurological model of hemispheric asymmetry. Gallagher contests the dominant ‘theory of mind’ account of autism, proposing instead an interactive, phenomenological model grounded in embodied intersubjectivity. Siegel frames autism as a deficit of neural integration arising from genetic or toxic causes, not relational failure. Flores invokes ‘normal autism’ in a Mahlerian developmental schema as a healthy forerunner phase. Arnevik’s systematic reviews address the clinical complexity of autism spectrum disorder co-occurring with substance use disorder. Together, these voices reveal autism as simultaneously a neurological, phenomenological, developmental, astrological, and clinical concern — a term whose depth-psychological resonance far exceeds any single framework.