Ambivalence occupies a contested position across the depth-psychology corpus. Its conceptual career begins with Bleuler’s coinage and Jung’s early engagement with the term as a formal, rather than merely pathological, property of psychic life — the simultaneous containment of opposites within a single thing. Jung, in the 1925 seminars and in his contribution to the Bleuler discussion preserved in Collected Works 18, insists that ambivalence is a ‘monistic conception’ in which contrasting aspects inhere in one and the same entity, distinguishing it sharply from the dualistic model of warring opposites. Hillman radicalizes this rehabilitation: against psychiatry’s pejorative linkage of ambivalence with schizophrenia, he argues that living in ambivalence — holding yea and nay, light and darkness together — constitutes ‘a way in itself,’ the natural concomitant of psychic wholeness. In the developmental and attachment literature, ambivalence migrates into the clinical taxonomy of insecure attachment: Ainsworth’s anxious-ambivalent category, elaborated by Bowlby, Ogden, and Flores, designates an infant’s chronic uncertainty before an inconsistent caregiver, producing dysregulation, preoccupation, and impaired autoregulation across the lifespan. Motivational Interviewing theory, represented by Miller, recruits ambivalence as a normative staging post in the change process rather than a fixed character defect. Neumann links ambivalence to the uroboric phase — a primal pleasure-pain unity predating differentiation. Taken together, the corpus charts a persistent tension between ambivalence as pathology and ambivalence as the necessary structure of depth.