James hillman revisioning
Re-Visioning Psychology (1975) is the founding manifesto of archetypal psychology — the book in which Hillman most fully articulates what it would mean to take soul seriously as the primary datum of psychological life. It began as the Terry Lectures at Yale in 1972, and the gap between lecture and publication matters: Hillman was not summarizing a finished position but thinking in public, working out a psychology that had no institutional home and no established method. The book is programmatic in the deepest sense — it does not describe a school so much as call one into being.
The announced subject is soul-making, a phrase Hillman draws from Keats. Soul here is not a substance, not a theological entity, and emphatically not the ego's deeper layer. It is a perspective — a way of deepening events into psychological reality through imaginative reflection. The book executes four methodological movements: personifying (the soul's native tendency to populate experience with figures), pathologizing (the soul's equally native tendency toward suffering, symptom, and limitation), psychologizing or seeing through (the capacity to read any statement as a statement about the soul), and dehumanizing as soul-making (the move away from anthropocentric humanism toward the gods and their governance). These are not stages in a therapeutic sequence. They are modes of attention, each irreducible to the others.
The polemic that runs beneath all four is against monotheism — not theological monotheism alone but psychological monotheism: the assumption that the psyche has one center, one telos, one integrating authority. Jung's Self-with-capital-S is the target here, though Hillman's critique is surgical rather than dismissive. He inherits Jung's polycentricity — the complex, the archetype, the objective psyche — and then refuses the late-Jungian pull toward unity. Where Jung's individuation narrative tends toward wholeness, Re-Visioning insists on irreducible plurality. The soul's multiplicity demands what Hillman calls a polytheistic psychology, one that honors the tensions among the gods rather than resolving them into a single dominant.
The intellectual lineage Hillman assembles is itself a polemic. He reaches behind Freud and Jung to Plotinus, Ficino, and Vico — what he calls the Southern tradition, episodic and subjective where the Northern tradition (Erasmus, Bacon, Freud) is systematic and objective. Ficino is especially load-bearing: for Ficino, soul was "the centre of nature... the bond and juncture of the universe," and everything was known via psychic images as first reality. Hillman found in this a foundation that could ground psychological work without reducing it to either clinical mechanism or spiritual ascent. As Samuels (1985) notes, Hillman regards Plotinus, Ficino, and Vico as genuine precursors — not historical curiosities but living resources for a psychology that had lost its roots.
The chapter on psychologizing — seeing through — is where the book's method becomes most explicit, and where Hermes enters as the presiding figure:
Psychologizing is always at variance with the positions of others; it is a countereducation, a negative learning, moving all standpoints off balance toward their borders, their extremes. At the borders Hermes rules, and in these regions of no-man's-land there can be nothing alien, nothing excluded.
Hermes — guide of thieves, dreams, and souls, the connector-between — is the god within psychologizing because psychologizing is always moving between opposing views, never arriving, never concluding. The method is deliberately errant: circular, pathologizing, proceeding by luck and timing rather than systematic accumulation. This is not a failure of rigor but its own kind of discipline, one that keeps the soul's complexity from being flattened into a therapeutic program.
The book's deepest wager is that pathology is not the enemy of soul but its disclosure. The soul's suffering, its symptoms, its compulsive returns to the same insoluble themes — these are not obstacles to psychological health but the very material through which depth becomes audible. This is why Re-Visioning refuses the language of cure, growth, and integration that dominated both clinical psychology and popular Jungianism in the 1970s. The soul does not need to be fixed. It needs to be heard.
Giegerich (2020) would later press hard against this position, arguing that archetypal psychology's remythologization carries the logical rupture of reflection within itself — that its gods are ultimately "allegories of former myths," requiring a "logic of make-believe." The disagreement is genuine and unresolved. Hillman holds fast to image as irreducible ground; Giegerich insists the soul has moved somewhere else, somewhere logic rather than image can follow. Re-Visioning is the text that makes that argument necessary.
- James Hillman — portrait of the founder of archetypal psychology
- Soul-making — Hillman's central term, drawn from Keats, for the deepening of experience into psychological reality
- Polytheistic psychology — the theological correlate of archetypal psychology's pluralism
- Wolfgang Giegerich — the post-Jungian thinker whose critique of imaginal psychology presses hardest against Hillman's foundations
Sources Cited
- Hillman, James, 1975, Re-Visioning Psychology
- Samuels, Andrew, 1985, Jung and the Post-Jungians
- Giegerich, Wolfgang, 2020, The Soul's Logical Life
- Russell, Dick, 2023, Life and Ideas of James Hillman