Aristotle regards what occurs in the former case as merely an act of phantasia, and only what occurs in the latter case as an act of remembering. Now, it should be clear that both ways of employing a phantasia involve having experiences with representational content.²⁷ Even to have an ordinary phantasia of, say, a forest fire is to have a forest fire represented to one in some way or other. Remembering some forest fire, as Aristotle thinks of it, goes beyond such representa-tion. It is not just a matter of having a forest fire represented to one. It also involves being aware, perhaps in a certain distinctive way, that what is represented to one is something that one did perceive at some time in the past.
— Hendrik Lorenz
Aristotle is drawing a line that most of us collapse without noticing. To picture a forest fire and to remember a forest fire are not the same act with different intensities — they are structurally different. Pure phantasia delivers a representation; memory delivers a representation plus a particular awareness that what appears now once appeared to you, in time, from the inside. That second layer is not just content — it is a claim about authorship, about who was present when.
This matters for depth work because so much of what we call memory is actually phantasia dressed in past-tense grammar. The image arrives with force, with vividness, even with apparent familiarity, but the additional awareness Aristotle describes — the sense that this is something one did perceive — may be absent or counterfeit. What the soul insists it remembers about a wound, a parent, a decisive moment may be a representation that has been rehearsed until it wears the costume of recollection. That rehearsal is not dishonesty; it is precisely what phantasia does when it runs without the temporal anchoring Aristotle requires. The distinction doesn't dissolve what the image carries. It asks you to hold it differently — as present content rather than as recovered fact.
Hendrik Lorenz·The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle·2006