Aristotle is solving a problem Plato created. Once you separate the soul from the body — once you make the rational part the true self and demote appetite to something that needs to be governed — you face an immediate puzzle: how does a body actually move toward anything? Perception alone cannot do it, because perception only registers what is present. The animal that can only perceive is trapped in the now, reactive, not purposive. What gets the body moving toward a future state is *phantasia*, the capacity to represent what is not yet here, to hold a prospective situation before the soul as if it were already something to meet.

This is a more generous account of imagination than the tradition usually remembers. Aristotle is not describing daydreaming or illusion; he is describing the cognitive machinery by which desire becomes locomotive, by which longing orients a body in space and time. What the soul lacks, what it represents as absent and therefore reaches toward — that is the engine. Lorenz is pointing at something uncomfortable inside this framework: the very structure of purposive life depends on a gap, a not-yet, a prospective object that keeps receding as the body moves. The animal moves because it does not have the thing. That condition does not resolve at the destination.