Pathos occupies a structurally pivotal position in the ancient psychological lexicon, and the depth-psychology corpus treats it with corresponding care across several interpretive traditions. In Aristotelian scholarship — represented most fully by Konstan and Cairns — pathos functions simultaneously as a technical category (emotion or affect as response to stimulus, inseparable from bodily change) and as a conceptual boundary-marker: what distinguishes a genuine emotion from a dispositional hexis, a virtue, or a mere reflex is precisely whether it conforms to the logic of pathos as reactive event. The Stoic tradition, examined by Graver, Sorabji, and Inwood, radicalizes this framework: the Stoics define pathos as a mistaken, excessive impulse — in Zeno’s formulation, a movement that disobeys reason — and prescribe apatheia, freedom from pathos, as the goal of the sage. Cicero’s confusion of pathos with nosos (disease) illuminates how readily the term slides between affect, suffering, and moral disorder. In Harrison’s ritual-mythological frame, pathos becomes a stage in the cosmic drama of the Year-Daimon: the sacrificial death that precedes resurrection. These divergent usages — Aristotelian cognitive event, Stoic irrational excess, ritual suffering — create a productive tension at the heart of classical depth-psychological inquiry, one that no single account has resolved.