Uncertainty occupies a contested and productive space across the depth-psychology corpus, functioning simultaneously as pathological condition, epistemological necessity, and ontological ground. The literature does not converge on a single valuation. In clinical traditions — Horney on neurotic self-distrust, Yalom on anxiety’s existential roots, LeDoux on the neurobiological distinction between the amygdala’s response to definite threat and the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis’s response to uncertain threat — uncertainty is framed primarily as a source of suffering to be metabolized, though not eliminated. Contemplative and transpersonal voices, notably Trungpa, locate uncertainty not merely as a precipitant of fear but as its reflexive mirror: the world returns to the subject the uncertainty the subject cannot bear in itself. McGilchrist offers the most sustained philosophical rehabilitation, arguing that creativity is predicated on uncertainty, that to reject it is to think outside time, and that science itself must remain provisional and alive. Siegel adds a developmental-trauma dimension: the plane of open awareness feels initially unsafe precisely because maximal uncertainty recalls early relational terror — yet healing requires learning to embrace it. Pauli grounds the term in physics through the uncertainty relation and its irreducible implications for observation, complementarity, and causality. What unifies these otherwise disparate treatments is the recognition that the drive to abolish uncertainty — in cognition, in relationship, or in cosmology — is itself a symptomatic act.