Within the depth-psychology corpus, symptom suppression occupies a contested and theoretically productive site. The literature does not treat suppression as a clinical success but rather as a dynamic that relocates, disguises, or amplifies pathology. Jung’s decisive statement — that the earlier suggestion theory, which sought to suppress symptoms by counteraction, was superseded by Freud’s recognition that ‘the cause of the illness was not removed with the suppression of the symptom’ — establishes the foundational critique. Janet, observing hysteria in clinical detail, documented the notorious substitution phenomenon: remove one symptom, and another arises in its place, often in an entirely different somatic register. Freudian metapsychology then mapped the intrapsychic economics underlying this substitution, locating neurotic symptoms as compromise formations between the Ucs. and Pcs. systems. Neumann extends the inquiry into the moral-collective domain, distinguishing suppression from repression and arguing that even voluntary suppression carries disastrous collective consequences. Fogel’s neuroscientific synthesis demonstrates that suppression increases sympathetic arousal, impairs memory, and degrades interpersonal life. Garland’s neuroimaging work adds that suppression delays and amplifies amygdala response rather than attenuating it, in contrast to reappraisal. Across these voices, symptom suppression is consistently framed not as therapeutic resolution but as a temporary, costly, and ultimately self-defeating avoidance of deeper psychic and somatic processes.