Stoicism

I see aidos in Epictetus as at all times an affective response. It is not merely an inclination to judge certain actions appropriate or inappropriate in relation to one’s self-conceived role in life, but also, and fundamentally, a disposition to experience a certain feeling

Graver argues that even within Stoic moral psychology, key affective states such as aidos retain an irreducibly felt, visceral character, challenging readings that reduce Stoic emotion theory to pure cognitive judgment.

Margaret Graver, Stoicism and Emotion, 2007thesis

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STOICISM AND EMOTION MARGARET R. GRAVER

This monograph establishes the primary scholarly framework for treating Stoic emotion theory — including synkatathesis and the hēgemonikon — as a systematic philosophy of affective cognition.

Margaret Graver, Stoicism and Emotion, 2007supporting

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complexes can have us. The existence of complexes throws serious doubt on the naive assumption of the unity of consciousness, which is equated with ‘psyche,’ and on the supremacy of the will.

Jung’s account of autonomous complexes that override conscious will constitutes an implicit depth-psychological counter-thesis to the Stoic hēgemonikon’s claim to sovereign rational governance of the soul.

Jung, Carl Gustav, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, 1960supporting

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the reflex which carries the stimulus over into its instinctive discharge is interfered with by psychization. Owing to this interference, the psychic processes exert an attraction on the impulse to act

Jung’s concept of the ‘reflective instinct’ — wherein psychic mediation interrupts automatic discharge — parallels the Stoic doctrine of synkatathesis as the moment of voluntary assent interposed between impression and action.

Jung, Carl Gustav, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, 1960supporting

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the outward situation releases a psychic process in which certain contents gather together and prepare for action. When we say that a person is ‘constellated’ we mean that he has taken up a position from which he can be expected to react in a quite definite way.

Jung’s notion of constellation as an involuntary preparatory psychic state parallels Stoic discussions of how phantasiai (impressions) dispose the hēgemonikon toward assent, yet foregrounds the non-voluntary character of this process.

Jung, Carl Gustav, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, 1960supporting

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An instinct which has undergone too much psychization can take its revenge in the form of an autonomous complex. This is one of the chief causes of neurosis.

Jung’s warning against over-rationalization of instinct implicitly critiques the Stoic program of subordinating all impulse to rational assent, suggesting that excessive psychic governance produces pathological autonomy in the repressed material.

Jung, Carl Gustav, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, 1960supporting

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the ego had every reason for practising the magic of names on complexes, for it is obvious enough that what I fear is something sinister that threatens to swallow me up.

Jung’s observation that the ego attempts nominal mastery over threatening psychic contents echoes the Stoic strategy of redefining passions through corrected assent, though Jung treats such attempts as ultimately insufficient.

Jung, Carl Gustav, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, 1960aside

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the immediate determining factor is not the ectopsychic instinct but the structure resulting from the interaction of instinct and the psychic situation of the moment.

Jung’s model of instinct modified by psychic context provides a structural analogue to the Stoic account of hormē (impulse) shaped by rational or irrational assent, though grounded in empirical rather than normative categories.

Jung, Carl Gustav, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, 1960aside

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