The Socratic Doctrine, as it figures across the depth-psychology corpus, is not a single proposition but a constellation of interrelated claims about self-knowledge, the examined life, the identity of virtue and knowledge, and the philosopher’s peculiar epistemic humility. The corpus engages this constellation from several directions. Edinger treats the twin Socratic imperatives — ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’ and ‘Know thyself’ — as the philosophical foundation of depth-psychological vocation itself, tracing a direct genealogical line from Socratic practice to analytic self-scrutiny. Sharpe and Ure, reading through Hadot, reconstruct Socratic doctrine as the inaugural formulation of philosophy as a way of life: the elenctic method, the inward turn, the care of the soul, and the absolute priority of moral intent over rhetorical success. Nietzsche enters the discussion as the great antagonist, diagnosing Socratism as a culturally dominant but ultimately unstable illusion that suppresses the tragic wisdom it displaces. Plato’s primary texts — the Meno, Apology, Phaedo, Protagoras — supply the doctrinal raw material: the paradox of virtue as unteachable knowledge, the maieutic function of aporia, the doctrine of reminiscence as epistemological foundation. Dodds and Burkert situate the Socratic psyche within the longer history of Greek religious and shamanistic soul-concepts. The central tension throughout is between Socratic doctrine as transformative practice and as theoretical system — a tension the corpus never fully resolves.