The term ‘signal’ occupies a surprisingly wide conceptual territory across the depth-psychology corpus, appearing not as a unified construct but as a contested boundary object between ethology, neuroscience, semiotics, and psychodynamic theory. In ethological framing—most fully developed by Lench via Maynard Smith and Lorenz—a signal is distinguished from a cue by its intentional communicative function: signals coevolve between sender and receiver, serving mutual adaptive interests, whereas cues convey information incidentally. This distinction carries direct consequence for understanding emotional expression, particularly grief, weeping, and submission displays, as biologically prepared, stereotypic transactions rather than mere epiphenomena. Simondon extends the concept into an information-theoretic register, treating the signal as that which is essentially unpredictable—the bearer of decision-capacity—whose signification emerges only through ‘disparation’ between an incoming signal and a receiver’s pre-existing form. Kandel and neurobiological writers invoke signal in the classical electrophysiological sense: action potentials, calcium-mediated neurotransmitter release, and neuromodulatory teaching signals (dopamine reward-prediction error in Schultz). Lacan appropriates the Freudian signal-anxiety formulation, reading the ego’s withdrawal of cathexis as the mechanism producing anxiety as a warning signal. Flores situates shame as a psychosocial signal marking boundary violations. Together these voices reveal a central tension: whether signal is primarily a biological transmission mechanism, an evolutionary communicative act, or a semiotic-structural event requiring a receiving context to produce meaning.