Sextus Empiricus, the second-century C.E. Pyrrhonist physician and philosopher, functions in the depth-psychology corpus primarily as an indispensable doxographical conduit — the figure through whom ancient sceptical and Stoic argumentation is transmitted to modern scholarship. Long and Sedley rely on him extensively as a source for the ten modes of suspension of judgement (the Agrippan and Aenesideman tropes), for Academic epistemology, for Stoic logic and the theory of impressions, and for Pyrrhonist methodology broadly construed. His *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* and *Against the Professors* (also rendered *Against the Mathematicians*) are cited to reconstruct positions no longer extant in primary form — Carneades on the convincing impression, Stoic preconception theory, and the systematic opposition of appearances. Sharpe, Ure, and Hadot also invoke him as a witness to the Stoic definition of philosophy as *technê peri ton bion*, the art of living. The tensions in his reception are real: he is simultaneously a hostile critic of Stoic syllogistic and definition, and an invaluable preserver of Stoic and Academic texts. Sorabji mobilises his locorum in reconstructing the passions debate. Collectively, the corpus treats Sextus as an adversarial archivist — a sceptic whose polemical thoroughness inadvertently secured the survival of the very doctrines he contested.
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. 2nd-cent. A.D. Pyrrhonist. See Index of sources. Good source for Pyrrhonism, 470; debt to Aenesidemus, 488; criticism of definition, 195; criticism of Stoic syllo
Long and Sedley identify Sextus as the pre-eminent source for Pyrrhonism, indebted to Aenesidemus, and a pointed critic of Stoic definition and syllogistic.
, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1987thesis
A Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.31-9 (1) Broadly speaking, this [suspension of judgement about everything] comes about because of the setting of things in opposition.
Sextus’s *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* is quoted at length to explain the fundamental Pyrrhonist mechanism of epochê — the systematic opposition of appearances and ideas to produce suspension of judgement.
, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1987thesis
Both Epictetus and the second-century sceptic, Sextus Empiricus, attest that for the Stoics of this time, philosophy is a technê peri ton bion or ‘art of living’ (Sextus Empiricus Adv. math. 11.170 [= SVF 3.598]
Sextus Empiricus is cited as an external witness corroborating the Stoic definition of philosophy as an art of living, placing his testimony alongside that of Epictetus.
, Philosophy as a Way of Life: History, Dimensions, Directions, 2021thesis
Both Epictetus and the second-century sceptic, Sextus Empiricus, attest that for the Stoics of this time, philosophy is a technê peri ton bion or ‘art of living’ (Sextus Empiricus Adv. math. 11.170 [= SVF 3.598]
Identical to the Ure passage, this citation confirms Sextus’s role as a cross-school witness to the Stoic conception of philosophy as practical art.
, Philosophy as a Way of Life: History, Dimensions, Directions, 2021thesis
E Sextus Empiricus, Against the professors 7.176-84 (1) Such then [i.e. D] is the first and general criterion of Carneades and his followers. But since an impression never stands in isolation but one depends on another like links in a chain
Sextus is the principal source for Carneades’ criterion of the convincing impression and its expansion into a coherentist account of belief formation.
, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1987supporting
I Sextus Empiricus, Against the professors 11.140 (Timon fr. 844, Caizzi 64) . . . nothing exists which is good or bad by nature, ‘but these things are decided on the part of men by convention,’ as Timon says.
Sextus preserves a fragment of Timon asserting the conventionality of value, functioning as a doxographical bridge to early Pyrrhonism.
, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1987supporting
T Sextus Empiricus, Against the professors 8.331a–332a (1) It is agreed that a preconception and conception must precede every object of investigation.
Sextus is quoted to illuminate the Stoic doctrine that preconceptions are necessary preconditions of inquiry, while simultaneously noting that their plurality leads the sceptic toward suspension of judgement.
, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1987supporting
F Sextus Empiricus, Against the professors 7.246 (SVF 2.65, part; continuing 39G) (1) Neither true nor false [impressions, according to the Stoics] are the generic ones.
Sextus transmits a Stoic argument about the logical status of generic impressions — neither true nor false — illustrating his role as primary doxographical source for Stoic epistemology.
, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1987supporting
I Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.135–40 (1) The eighth mode is the one derived from relativity, on the basis of which we deduce that, since all things are relative, we will suspend judgement about what things exist absolutely and in nature.
Sextus expounds the mode of relativity, one of the ten Pyrrhonist modes, arguing that the relational character of all appearances necessitates epochê regarding absolute natures.
, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1987supporting
C Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.79-91 (1) Such [see B] is the first mode of suspending judgement. The second, as we said, is that derived from the difference between men.
Sextus presents the second of the ten modes — variation between individual human beings — as grounds for suspending judgement about external objects.
, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1987supporting
I Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrho
Sextus’s *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* is cited in the context of Arcesilaus and the New Academy’s methodology, linking Academic and Pyrrhonist traditions of suspension of judgement.
, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1987supporting
H Sextus Empiricus, Against the prof
Sextus is invoked in the debate over cognitive impressions and Stoic epistemology, serving as a source for the Academic-Stoic controversy over the criterion of truth.
, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1987supporting
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, Against the Logicians = Sextus Empiricus, with an English Translation by R.G. Bury in four volumes, t. II
Hadot’s bibliography cites the standard Loeb edition of Sextus’s *Against the Logicians*, marking him as a standard reference source in the scholarly apparatus.
, What Is Ancient Philosophy?, 2002aside
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, Against the Logicians = Sextus Empiricus, with an English Translation by R.G. Bury in four volumes, t. II
Parallel bibliographic citation of Sextus in Hadot’s earlier edition, confirming his status as a standard scholarly resource for ancient philosophy.
, What Is Ancient Philosophy?, 1995aside
Sextus Empiricus ; Against the Mathematicians 7. 12 153 n. 177. 145-6 (Speusippus) 907. 239(SVF 3. 399) 281 nn. 57-87. 349 254 n. 811. 22 -6 172 n. 24
Sorabji’s index locorum lists multiple passages from Sextus’s *Against the Mathematicians*, demonstrating his systematic use as an evidential source in the reconstruction of Stoic emotion theory.
, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 2000aside
Sextus Empiricus Adv. math. 11.170 (= SVF 3.598); trans. Bett modified; Epictetus, Disc. 1.15.2; see John Sellars, Art of Living
A footnote citation of Sextus’s *Adversus Mathematicos* to support the claim that the Stoics defined philosophy as a technê, citing the standard SVF equivalence.
, Philosophy as a Way of Life: History, Dimensions, Directions, 2021aside
Sextus Empiricus Adv. math. 11.170 (= SVF 3.598); trans. Bett modified; Epictetus, Disc. 1.15.2; see John Sellars, Art of Living
Identical footnote to the Ure passage, citing Sextus as corroborating evidence for the Stoic definition of philosophy as an art of living.
, Philosophy as a Way of Life: History, Dimensions, Directions, 2021aside
Sextus Empiricus 285
A bare index reference to Sextus Empiricus at page 285 of Seaford’s work on money and early Greek thought, indicating only a passing mention without elaboration.
, Money and the Early Greek Mind: Homer, Philosophy, Tragedy, 2004aside