Sensing, as treated across the depth-psychology corpus, occupies a contested and richly stratified position. In Jungian typological literature — most extensively elaborated by von Franz and Quenk — Sensing names a discrete psychological function concerned with the direct apprehension of concrete, present-moment reality, standing in structural opposition to Intuition and entering into complex hierarchical relations with Thinking and Feeling within the typological framework. The distinction between Introverted and Extraverted Sensing, and the dynamics of Sensing as dominant, auxiliary, tertiary, or inferior function, generate an entire phenomenology of character, stress response, and individuation potential. Alongside this Jungian lineage, neuroscientific contributors — Damasio, Craig, Porges, Barrett, Levine, and LeDoux — reframe sensing as the biological substrate of consciousness itself: the organism’s continuous monitoring of internal and external states, indistinguishable at its foundations from feeling and homeostatic regulation. Damasio’s insistence that sensing and responding constitute the very machinery upon which consciousness and feeling depend gives the term an ontological weight that resonates, perhaps unexpectedly, with Simondon’s transductive account of sensation as the living being’s grasping of polarity relative to its own median zone. The Taoist I Ching, via Liu I-ming, introduces a further valence: authentic sensing as a function of the ‘real mind’ rather than the artificial mentality, true sensing occurring only when yin and yang commune through the mind of Tao. These convergences and divergences — typological, neurobiological, metaphysical — make ‘Sensing’ one of the more philosophically charged terms in the corpus.