Resurrection as Reconstitution occupies a singular position in the depth-psychological and patristic corpus alike: it designates not mere resuscitation but the restoration of a being to its original, constitutive wholeness — a return to what was lost, dismembered, or corrupted. Gregory of Nyssa furnishes the locus classicus, defining resurrection explicitly as ‘the reconstitution of our nature in its original form,’ a formulation that anchors the concept in protology as much as eschatology. John of Damascus extends this logic: resurrection is the re-union of soul and body, the second state of what has fallen. Within depth psychology, Edinger maps the same structural logic onto the individuation process, reading the reconstitution of Osiris’s dismembered body by Isis as a mythological parallel to Christ’s resurrection and to the psychological movement from mortificatio to rebirth. Jung, in the Collected Works, distinguishes resurrection from reincarnation precisely by introducing ‘transmutation’ — the reconstituted being is not merely returned but transformed, potentially elevated to the corpus glorificationis. Von Franz situates this motif within alchemical symbolism, where the resurrection of Osiris through grain-sprouting in the mummy’s wrappings literalizes the death-and-reconstitution sequence. The central tension running through all these treatments is whether reconstitution implies identity-preservation or qualitative transformation — whether what is reassembled is the same nature or a glorified, incorruptible surpassing of it.