Reputation

Within the depth-psychology corpus, reputation occupies a charged and contested space between the inner life and the social world. Hillman’s treatment in Kinds of Power is the most sustained: he refuses the Jungian deprecation of persona as mere mask, arguing instead that reputation is constitutive of selfhood — ‘to be is to be perceived,’ as Berkeley’s formula captures it — and that contempt for one’s public image betrays both the judgment of others and the daimonic angel that lives in one’s actions. Yet Hillman also distinguishes reputation from prestige, warning that prestige is false reputation, a hollow mimicry built on name-dropping rather than character. The ancient Greek material furnishes the deepest substrate: Adkins demonstrates that Homeric culture is a shame-culture in which the chief good is to be well spoken of, and that this standard persists tenaciously into the classical period. Plato’s Laws insists that a good reputation in the world corresponds to a genuine moral reality, since even imperfect observers can discern goodness. The Zhuangzi tradition counterposes Daoist detachment, presenting the pursuit of reputation and gain as the common compulsion from which the sage withdraws. Dōgen similarly frames renunciation of fame as prerequisite to genuine practice. The term thus serves as a hinge between exterior social validation and interior psychological reality — a site where persona, honour, shame, and the daimonic intersect.

In the library 12 passages

the supposedly superficial image of the persona is the exterior face of the self that is actually and truly you. The husk and the shell belong as much to the complete nut as does the kernel. And the value of the nut is given by the desires of society for it. A good nut has a good reputation.

Hillman argues that reputation is not a superficial mask but a constitutive dimension of selfhood, inseparable from the self as the husk is from the kernel.

Hillman, James, Kinds of Power: A Guide to Its Intelligent Uses, 1995thesis

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The condemnation of prestige as false reputation goes back a long way. Cicero (De Officiis) refers to a supposed remark of Socrates: ‘Make yourself the sort of man you want people to think you are’

Hillman traces the ancient critique of prestige as counterfeit reputation, distinguishing the earned social standing of genuine character from the hollow performance of name-dropping.

Hillman, James, Kinds of Power: A Guide to Its Intelligent Uses, 1995thesis

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John Adams, the second American President, a capable though somewhat modest and stubborn man, admitted to a ‘passion for distinction.’ That’s what drove him. He had an ambition to be recognized.

Hillman situates reputation as the social face of ambition, the drive for recognition and distinction that animates the pursuit of power.

Hillman, James, Kinds of Power: A Guide to Its Intelligent Uses, 1995thesis

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to value a good reputation in the world, for there is no truth greater and more important than th[is] … Even bad men have a divine instinct which guesses rightly, and very many who are utterly depraved form correct notions and judgments of the differences between the good and bad.

Plato argues that collective judgment about reputation tracks genuine moral reality, making a good public reputation a reliable if imperfect indicator of virtue.

Plato, Laws, -348thesis

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In Homer the end is undoubted: the chief good is to be well spoken of, the chief ill to be badly spoken of, by one’s society, as a result of the successes and failures which that society values most highly. In other words, Homeric society is a ‘shame-culture’.

Adkins establishes the foundational Greek value-structure in which reputation — being well or badly spoken of — constitutes the supreme good and ill of social existence.

Arthur W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values, 1960supporting

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After all, there are no men who do not strive for reputation and seek gain. If you’re rich, people flock to you; flocking to you, they bow and scrape; and when they bow and scrape, this shows they honor you.

The Zhuangzi presents the universal human striving for reputation and gain as the worldly norm from which the Daoist sage consciously withdraws.

Watson, Burton, The Complete Works of Zhuangzi, 2013supporting

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it is in no way inherently discreditable for a character like Theseus to be concerned for his reputation; that in revealing his commitment to his reputation he is remaining true to himself

Cairns argues that concern for reputation, far from being discreditable, can express authentic self-consistency and integrity of character in the Greek ethical framework.

Douglas L. Cairns, Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature, 1993supporting

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if we lack the mind of awakening, if we do not detach ourselves from our [ego-centered] self, and if we are unable to abandon fame and profit, we will neither be able to become a person of the Way nor be able to understand true reality.

Dōgen places the renunciation of fame and reputation alongside ego-detachment as necessary preconditions for genuine spiritual practice and awakening.

supporting

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father thereby gains a fine reputation. {Fifth Yin occupies the noble position with its softness and yielding, thereby staying within the Mean and maintaining a proper response … It is by using such means to carry on the affairs of one’s predecessor that one thereby practices the Dao of gaining a fine reputation.}

The I Ching commentary presents the gaining of a fine reputation as the natural consequence of virtuous, yielding conduct in alignment with the Dao.

Wang Bi, Richard John Lynn, The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi, 1994supporting

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in the early period this also entails that he is good in the eyes of others, for the notions and definitions of goodness are plain and uniform: a man appears to others as he is.

Snell identifies the archaic Greek assumption that inner virtue and outward reputation are transparent to one another, making social recognition a direct reflection of real worth.

Snell, Bruno, The discovery of the mind; the Greek origins of European, 1953supporting

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This ‘Way’ you tell me about is inane and inadequate, a fraudulent, crafty, vain, hypocritical affair, not the sort of thing that is capable of preserving the Truth within.

The Zhuangzi’s figure of the robber Zhi dismisses conventional moral reputation as hypocrisy, framing reputation-seeking as incompatible with preserving inner truth.

Watson, Burton, The Complete Works of Zhuangzi, 2013aside

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