Re-enactment occupies a pivotal position in the depth-psychological literature as the somatic and behavioral counterpart to the better-known concept of repetition compulsion. Where Freud theorized that the psyche compulsively replays unresolved trauma through dreams, relationships, and symptoms, the somatic tradition—represented most forcefully by Peter A. Levine—locates re-enactment in the organism’s failed attempt to discharge thwarted survival responses upon the external world. Levine’s central argument is that re-enactment externalizes what must ultimately be processed internally: so long as the world serves as the stage for unresolved traumatic energy, the underlying neurobiological charge remains intact and the enactment is doomed to repeat without resolution. Bessel van der Kolk’s clinical case material, cited within Levine’s corpus, dramatizes this dynamic with particular force, illustrating how re-enactment carries both a self-destructive momentum and a residual drive toward mastery. The relational tradition, visible in Ogden’s sensorimotor framework, extends the concept into the therapeutic dyad itself, insisting that enactments are mutually co-created by therapist and client histories colliding in real time. Lorenz introduces a philosophically distinct usage in the Aristotelian tradition, treating re-enactment as the mere revival of a sensory impression without the temporal awareness that constitutes genuine remembering—a distinction that casts the clinical phenomenon in sharper epistemological relief. Across these divergent registers, the term marks the threshold between compulsion and transformation.