The psyche-soma split occupies a central and contested position across the depth-psychological corpus, functioning simultaneously as a clinical diagnosis, a philosophical problem, and a marker of civilizational pathology. Marion Woodman names the condition explicitly, identifying it as the presenting wound of the majority of her analysands and arguing that any therapeutic approach excluding the body is as one-sided as analysis conducted without dreams. Donald Kalsched grounds the split in the traumatic dissociation of mind from body, tracing the moment when the animating spirit abandons the somatic domain and becomes encapsulated in state-dependent somatic memory. Winnicott contributes the developmental axis: under conditions of insufficient maternal holding, the mind detaches from psychosomatic unity and becomes a ‘thing in itself,’ a pathological mind-psyche that usurps rather than serves experiential integration. Gilbert Simondon approaches the same phenomenon through a process-philosophical lens, describing individuation as the partial splitting of a prior psychosomatic unity into distinct somatic and psychical domains. Thomas Moore, drawing on Ficino, frames the split as a loss of soul’s mediating function between spirit and matter, resulting in the schizophrenic alienation characteristic of modernity. Jung himself refused reduction in either direction, insisting on the psyche’s status as anima media natura — a half-bodily, half-spiritual substance irreducible to either pole. The term thus marks the intersection of trauma theory, developmental psychology, phenomenology, and cultural critique.