Prediction occupies a central position in contemporary depth-neuropsychology as both a mechanistic principle of brain function and a conceptual bridge between neuroscience and the phenomenology of experience. The corpus reveals two principal registers in which the term operates. The first, and most extensively developed, is the predictive-processing or predictive-coding framework championed by Lisa Feldman Barrett, wherein the brain is reconceived not as a reactive stimulus-response organ but as a proactive generative engine that continuously issues probabilistic models of incoming sensory data, tests them against reality, and resolves discrepancies through prediction error. This framework bears directly on the construction of emotion, interoception, chronic pain, anxiety, and depression, unifying what classical neuroscience treated as separate disorders under a common computational logic. The second register, elaborated by Wolfram Schultz, situates prediction at the heart of dopaminergic reward learning: prediction error signals encode the difference between expected and received reward, functioning as teaching signals that govern behavioral plasticity and underlie addiction. These two strands converge in discussions of reinforcement learning, aesthetic pleasure, and acculturation. Tensions persist between accounts that emphasize top-down conceptual generation and those foregrounding bottom-up error correction, as well as between computational and phenomenological understandings of what it means for a brain to ‘predict.’