Philautia

The Seba library treats Philautia in 6 passages, across 2 authors (including Douglas L. Cairns, Ricoeur, Paul).

In the library

the good man, who is most truly a self-lover, since he cares for what is best in himself (and therefore realizes his full potential as a human being), is he who acts for the sake of to kalon

Cairns expounds the Aristotelian thesis that authentic philautia — love directed at one's highest rational self — is inseparable from virtuous action oriented toward to kalon, thereby rehabilitating self-love as the telos of ethical excellence.

Douglas L. Cairns, Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature, 1993thesis

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the good man should be a lover of self (det philauton einat) (9.8.1169a12)

Ricoeur, glossing Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, marks the philosophical necessity of philautia as a reflexive orientation of the good man toward himself, noting the subtle interplay between non-reflexive and reflexive forms of autos.

Ricoeur, Paul, Oneself as Another, 1992thesis

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philautia: (n.) self-love

Cairns's glossary entry formally locates philautia within the ethical-psychological lexicon of ancient Greek moral thought, positioning it alongside pathos, philotimia, and philia as a structurally significant term in the honour-shame complex.

Douglas L. Cairns, Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature, 1993supporting

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This 'as being' (as being what the other is) averts any subsequent egoistic leanings: it is constitutive of mutuality.

Ricoeur argues that the structure of mutuality in friendship guards against the egoistic collapse of self-love, showing how philautia is ethically conditioned by its orientation toward the genuinely other.

Ricoeur, Paul, Oneself as Another, 1992supporting

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if one asks by what right the self is declared to be worthy of esteem, it must be answered that it is not principally by reason of its accomplishments but fundamentally by reason of its capacities

Ricoeur grounds legitimate self-esteem — the constructive face of philautia — not in achievement but in the fundamental human capacity for action, thus distinguishing ethical self-regard from narcissistic self-aggrandizement.

Ricoeur, Paul, Oneself as Another, 1992supporting

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anaideia 98-9, 125, 151-2, 155, 159-60 … conscience 28-42, 44 n.105, 142-4, 166-7, 203-4

Cairns's index co-locates the conceptual neighbourhood of philautia — anaideia, conscience, aretē, dunamis — revealing the structural field within which self-love is evaluated in ancient ethical psychology.

Douglas L. Cairns, Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature, 1993aside

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