Passions

The term ‘passions’ occupies a contested and multi-layered position across the depth-psychology corpus, bridging Stoic philosophy, Orthodox asceticism, and contemporary transpersonal psychology. In the Stoic tradition, as reconstructed by Inwood and Nussbaum, the passions are cognitive events — assents to false value-judgements — and thus fall entirely within the rational agent’s purview, making their governance a matter of moral responsibility rather than merely temperamental management. The Philokalic tradition, by contrast, deploys an elaborate taxonomy of passions distributed across the faculties of body, soul, intellect, and reason, treating them as ontological distortions that obscure the divine image and must be progressively purified through ascetic practice toward the goal of dispassion (apatheia). Here the passions are not sins per se but diseased conditions that, left unchecked, progressively enslave the person and dissolve personal identity. Welwood introduces a third position: that passion, rightly understood as unconditional resonance with being, contains the seed of its own transformation, pointing toward surrender and spiritual awakening. The fundamental tension running through the corpus is whether passions are to be extirpated, governed, or transmuted — a question that divides Stoic apatheia, Christian hesychasm, and Buddhist-inflected transpersonal thought in ways that illuminate the deepest disagreements in Western and Eastern psychologies of the soul.

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the passion may be said to be totally in the agent’s control, since the opinion or judgement is the assent given to a proposition embodied in the presentation. Thus the agent is responsible for his passions just as he is responsible for everything else that he does.

Inwood articulates the Stoic identification of passions with judgements, establishing that passions are cognitive acts of assent and therefore entirely the agent’s moral responsibility.

Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985thesis

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The passions that pertain to the body differ from those that pertain to the soul; those affecting the appetitive faculty differ from those affecting the incensive faculty; and those of the intelligence differ from those of the intellect and the reason. But all intercommunicate, and all collaborate.

The Philokalia articulates a systematic taxonomy of passions distributed across all human faculties, each category distinct yet mutually reinforcing, forming the structural map of the soul’s pathology.

Palmer, G. E. H. and Sherrard, Philip and Ware, Kallistos (trs.), The Philokalia, Volume 4, 1995thesis

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Passions are the place, the seat of evil in the human person. The impassioned man…does not act on his own but is rather acted upon…he loses his personality, his personal identity. He becomes chaotic, with multiple faces, or rather—masks.

Fr. Florovsky’s definition, cited by Coniaris, identifies the passions as the ontological locus of evil, functioning through depersonalization and the dissolution of authentic selfhood.

Coniaris, Anthony M., Philokalia: The Bible of Orthodox Spirituality, 1998thesis

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Passion can take two very different forms. In its initial upsurge it radiates energy and fire, lifting us out of ourselves and generating powerful, fresh inspiration. Yet it can also be a force that leads us down into addiction and delusion.

Welwood posits a dual nature of passion — as liberating upsurge and as enslaving fixation — orienting the term toward a transpersonal psychology of transformation rather than mere pathology.

Welwood, John, Toward a Psychology of Awakening Buddhism, Psychotherapy,, 2000thesis

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passion is an irrational activity of the soul, resulting from the notion of something good or bad. For the notion of something good results in desire, and the notion of something bad results in anger.

John of Damascus provides a synthetic philosophical definition of passion as an irrational soul-movement arising from cognitive appraisals of good and bad, grounding the term in a Christianized Aristotelian framework.

John of Damascus, Saint John of Damascus Collection, 2016thesis

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the passions are not sins but sinful conditions or diseases that can develop into sins if we do not discipline them… passions work in four stages—first, in the heart; secondly, in the face; thirdly, in words; and fourthly in evil deeds.

Coniaris transmits the Patristic distinction between passion as disease and passion as sin, articulating a developmental four-stage model of passion’s progressive actualization.

Coniaris, Anthony M., Philokalia: The Bible of Orthodox Spirituality, 1998thesis

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The ultimate goal of passion is surrender. This is the heart’s true desire. The fruition of sexual pursuit is the moment of orgasm, a moment of total letting go. The French call it ‘the little death.’

Welwood argues that passion’s teleological end is not satisfaction of a particular object but surrender of the ego-structure itself, reframing passion as a vehicle for spiritual dissolution.

Welwood, John, Toward a Psychology of Awakening Buddhism, Psychotherapy,, 2000thesis

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‘Although the rational animal has a nature such as to use Reason in every situation and to be guided by it, we often turn our back on it, when we are subject to another more violent motion.’

Chrysippus, via Inwood, identifies the passion as a competing motion that overrides reason, revealing the central Stoic paradox of passions as rational failures within a wholly rational soul.

Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985thesis

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These eight passions should be destroyed as follows: gluttony by self-control; unchastity by desire for God and longing for the blessings held in store; avarice by compassion for the poor; anger by goodwill and love for all men.

The Philokalia presents a counter-passion therapeutic model in which each passion is overcome not by suppression but by its positive spiritual antidote.

Palmer, G. E. H. and Sherrard, Philip and Ware, Kallistos (trs.), The Philokalia, Volume 1, 1979supporting

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Stoic apatheia, and by implication the ideal of philosophical tranquillity that continues to inspire philosophers up to Montaigne and Lipsius, comes at too high a price: namely the radical extirpation of the passions that express our attachments to life and to others.

Sharpe and Ure articulate the central critique of Stoic apatheia — that extirpating the passions severs the very attachments constitutive of human life — tracing this objection from Descartes to Schopenhauer.

Matthew Sharpe and Michael Ure, Philosophy as a Way of Life: History, Dimensions, Directions, 2021supporting

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Stoic apatheia, and by implication the ideal of philosophical tranquillity that continues to inspire philosophers up to Montaigne and Lipsius, comes at too high a price: namely the radical extirpation of the passions that express our attachments to life and to others.

Repeating the critique from a co-authored perspective, this passage establishes the extirpation of passions as the definitive fault line between Stoic and non-Stoic ethics of emotion.

Sharpe, Matthew and Ure, Michael, Philosophy as a Way of Life: History, Dimensions, Directions, 2021supporting

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The first type of dispassion is complete abstention from the actual committing of sin… The fourth type of dispassion is the complete purging even of passion-free images; this is found in those who have made their intellect a pure, transparent mirror of God.

The Philokalia maps a four-stage developmental typology of dispassion, revealing that liberation from the passions is a graduated process culminating in noetic transparency.

Palmer, G. E. H. and Sherrard, Philip and Ware, Kallistos (trs.), The Philokalia, Volume 4, 1995supporting

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Categorizing and naming the swarm of passions that afflict the psyche was important to the Fathers of the Philokalia, since it was a precious tool of discernment. It enabled them to track the subtle workings of the passions.

Coniaris explains the ascetic-psychological function of passion taxonomy as a diagnostic instrument of discernment, essential for tracking the operations of evil in the soul.

Coniaris, Anthony M., Philokalia: The Bible of Orthodox Spirituality, 1998supporting

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Nothing so fills the heart with contrition and humbles the soul as solitude embraced with self-awareness, and utter silence. And nothing so destroys the state of inner stillness and takes away the divine power that comes from it as the following six universal passions: insolence, gluttony, talkativeness, distraction, pretentiousness and the mistress of the passions, self-conceit.

Gregory of Sinai identifies six passions as the principal destroyers of hesychast stillness, with self-conceit named as their queen, linking passion directly to the disruption of contemplative practice.

Palmer, G. E. H. and Sherrard, Philip and Ware, Kallistos (trs.), The Philokalia, Volume 4, 1995supporting

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It does not lie within our power to decide whether or not the passions are going to harass and attack the soul. But it does lie within power to prevent impassioned thoughts from lingering within us and arousing the passions to action.

The Philokalia distinguishes between the involuntary arising of passions — beyond the will — and the voluntary assent to impassioned thoughts, locating moral agency at the threshold of consent.

Palmer, G. E. H. and Sherrard, Philip and Ware, Kallistos (trs.), The Philokalia, Volume 2, 1981supporting

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Nothing so fills the heart with contrition and humbles the soul as solitude embraced with self-awareness, and utter silence.

Gregory of Sinai frames stillness and self-awareness as the primary prophylactics against the passions, situating hesychast practice within a broader psycho-spiritual therapy.

Palmer, G. E. H. and Sherrard, Philip and Ware, Kallistos (trs.), The Philokalia, Volume 4, 1995supporting

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Passion is, in essence, unconditional, because it is an immediate, unfabricated resonance with life, the life inside us connecting with the life outside. This resonance with reality is an essential constituent of our being.

Welwood redefines passion at its root as unconditional ontological resonance, distinguishing this primordial form from the conditioned, object-clinging passion that leads to obsession.

Welwood, John, Toward a Psychology of Awakening Buddhism, Psychotherapy,, 2000supporting

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First the memory brings some passion-free thought into the intellect. By its lingering there, passion is aroused. When the passion is not eradicated, it persuades the intellect to assent to it. Once this assent is given, the actual sin is then committed.

Maximos the Confessor traces the genesis of passion through a sequential process from neutral thought to assent to actualized sin, providing the Philokalic equivalent of a cognitive-dynamic model.

Palmer, G. E. H. and Sherrard, Philip and Ware, Kallistos (trs.), The Philokalia, Volume 4, 1995supporting

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The purification of the soul is release from the passions, and release from the passions gives birth to love.

This lapidary Philokalic formulation establishes the teleological arc: purification through passion-release leads not to emptiness but to love, the passions’ transformative endpoint.

Palmer, G. E. H. and Sherrard, Philip and Ware, Kallistos (trs.), The Philokalia, Volume 4, 1995supporting

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By overcoming such longing and fear, together with the self-love which has engendered them, you have killed at a single blow all the passions which have come into being through them and from them, as well as the principal source of all evil, ignorance.

The Philokalia identifies self-love as the generative root of all passions and ignorance as their metaphysical source, unifying ethical and noetic dimensions of the passion problem.

Palmer, G. E. H. and Sherrard, Philip and Ware, Kallistos (trs.), The Philokalia, Volume 4, 1995supporting

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after being tamed and taught to graze like cattle, the passions can become savage once more through our negligence and regain the ferocity of wild beasts.

The Philokalia employs vivid animal imagery to warn that passions subdued through ascetic effort are never permanently domesticated but remain liable to resurgence through spiritual negligence.

Palmer, G. E. H. and Sherrard, Philip and Ware, Kallistos (trs.), The Philokalia, Volume 1, 1979supporting

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‘Those same things in whose presence we experience distress are objects of fear when they are impending and approaching.’ ‘If the wise man should be open to distress, he would also be open to anger… and also to pity and envy.’

Nussbaum, drawing on Cicero and Chrysippus, demonstrates the Stoic doctrine of emotional interdependence: admitting one passion opens the agent to the full cascade of irrational emotions.

Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, 1994supporting

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Some world religions, i.e., Buddhism and Hinduism are dedicated to the elimination of desire and passion. Buddha saw desire as the source of all evil, suffering, and conflict.

Coniaris situates the Orthodox treatment of passions comparatively against Buddhist and Hindu traditions, noting the shared diagnosis of desire as the root of suffering while pointing toward distinct Christian therapeutic paths.

Coniaris, Anthony M., Philokalia: The Bible of Orthodox Spirituality, 1998supporting

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Distractive thoughts are the promptings of the demons and precursors of the passions, just as such promptings and mental images are also the precursors of particular actions. There can be no action, either for good or evil, that is not initially provoked by the particular thought of that action.

Gregory of Sinai locates demonic agency at the threshold of passion-formation, situating thoughts as the intermediate precursors through which passions are ignited prior to action.

Palmer, G. E. H. and Sherrard, Philip and Ware, Kallistos (trs.), The Philokalia, Volume 4, 1995supporting

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Fantasy is not wrought into an image, passion is not energized, without unperceived hidden demonic impulsion.

The Philokalia attributes the energizing of passion to covert demonic operation, adding a pneumatological dimension to the psychology of passion arousal.

Palmer, G. E. H. and Sherrard, Philip and Ware, Kallistos (trs.), The Philokalia, Volume 4, 1995aside

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These involuntary responses are not here attributed to impulses… they are not the result of assent. But Seneca also says that they occur ‘after the opinion that one…’

Inwood exposes a tension in Seneca’s account of ‘preliminary passions’ — involuntary affective reactions that resist the standard Stoic assent model, threatening psychological monism.

Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985supporting

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Chrysippus and other Stoics did compare the weakness of character lying at the root of moral errors with a bodily disease. The habit of talking about the weaknesses of the soul’s moral disposition by means of an analogy with the body’s illnesses goes back to at least Plato.

Inwood traces the medical metaphor of passion-as-disease from Plato through Chrysippus, establishing the Stoic pathology of passion as rooted in a dispositional weakness of character rather than isolated episodes.

Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 1985supporting

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we never cease to add to the repertoire of thoughts, in the broad sense of the term, including cognitions, volitions, and emotions, whose meaning we understand without taking into account the differences between the persons to whom they are attributed. This is what is confirmed by the various treatises on the passions from book 2 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric.

Ricoeur situates the classical treatises on the passions within a phenomenology of impersonal mental predicates, noting that passion-descriptions carry meaning independently of particular attribution to any single subject.

Ricoeur, Paul, Oneself as Another, 1992aside

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If you wish to master your thoughts, concentrate on the passions and you will easily drive the thoughts arising from them out of your intellect.

Maximos the Confessor recommends targeting the passions as the more efficient therapeutic lever for clearing impassioned thoughts, reversing the usual direction of cognitive intervention.

Palmer, G. E. H. and Sherrard, Philip and Ware, Kallistos (trs.), The Philokalia, Volume 1, 1979supporting

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if one passion finds a place in you and takes root there, it will introduce other passions also into the same shrine. For even though the passions, as well as their instigators the demons, are opposed to each other, yet they are all at one in seeking our perdition.

The Philokalia articulates the principle of passion’s self-propagating nature: a single entrenched passion opens the soul to further passions, despite their mutual antagonism.

Palmer, G. E. H. and Sherrard, Philip and Ware, Kallistos (trs.), The Philokalia, Volume 4, 1995aside

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