The term ‘Noble’ traverses the depth-psychology corpus along two intersecting axes: the genealogical-evaluative and the cosmological-positional. Nietzsche furnishes the most sustained psychological analysis, forging ‘noble’ into a diagnostic instrument for distinguishing life-affirming selfhood — characterized by spontaneous action, the swift exhaustion of ressentiment, bold recklessness, and an excess of formative power — from the reactive, slave-born morality that inverts and ultimately supplants it. His Genealogy of Morals insists that ‘noble’ originally designated nothing unegoistic; the aristocratic valuation of ‘good’ preceded and was ontologically independent of the ‘unegoistic/egoistic’ antithesis imposed by herd instinct. A parallel positional usage appears in Wang Bi’s commentary on the I Ching, where ‘noble’ names a cosmological rank: yang positions are noble, yin positions humble, and the ‘noble man’ (junzi) is he who inhabits his position with appropriate vigilance and self-restraint. The classical Greek strand, examined by Snell and Hobbs, treats nobility as the experiential recognition of one’s own arete — a Homeric hero ‘experiences that he is noble’ — while andreia (courage) retains an ineliminable noble valence that resists any value-neutral reduction. Auerbach tracks the sociological mutation of the concept from birth-ascribed rank toward personal election and refined interiority. Onians and Benveniste illuminate the Indo-European semantic roots, where ‘free,’ ‘noble,’ and ‘procreative desire’ converge. Across these registers, nobility functions as a pressure point between ontology, ethics, and power.