Network Thinking—and its alias cluster-thinking—occupies a distinctive if diffuse position within the depth-psychology corpus, appearing less as a named methodology than as an implicit epistemological commitment running through neuroscientific, phenomenological, and systems-theoretic contributions to the field. The concept designates a mode of cognition and ontological orientation that privileges relational interconnection, distributed causation, and emergent organization over linear, hierarchical, or essentialist models. Daniel Siegel provides its most explicit formulation, directly invoking ‘systems thinking’ as the mental process by which the clinician apprehends profound interconnectedness rather than treating mind or self as discrete, bounded entities. Lisa Feldman Barrett’s constructionist neuroscience supplies a parallel structural argument: the brain operates as a predictive, concept-generating network whose emergent emotional categories cannot be reduced to localized neural organs. Evan Thompson’s enactive biology grounds network thinking in connectionist architecture and autopoietic self-organization, while Iain McGilchrist insists that any genuine network understanding must resist reduction to a ‘machine model’ of rearrangeable parts. Dacher Keltner approaches the same terrain aesthetically, arguing that awe is precisely the affective signal that a systems-level organization has been perceived holistically. The central tension in the corpus lies between those who treat network thinking as a corrective cognitive tool—a deliberate intellectual reorientation—and those who regard it as a description of ontological reality that perception itself must be trained to register.