Moral psychology, as the depth-psychology corpus treats it, is never a single discipline but a contested terrain where the psyche’s inner economy confronts normative demands from culture, theology, and the individuation process itself. Erich Neumann’s foundational challenge — that the ‘old ethic’ suppresses shadow rather than integrating it — establishes a fault line running through the entire tradition: conventional morality as a collective fiction versus conscience as a genuine depth-psychological imperative. Jung amplifies this tension by insisting that the more one investigates the psychology of crime or sin, the less one can sustain abstract moral judgment, while simultaneously arguing that surrendering judgment forfeits a vital psychic function. Hillman radicalizes the position further, proposing that archetypal psychology does not look at myths morally but at moralities mythically, dissolving normative monoculture into imaginal plurality. A different register appears in Schaberg’s historical account of Bill Wilson, where ‘moral psychology’ names a specific therapeutic philosophy — ego-reduction, usefulness to others — grounded in Silkworth’s medical framework for alcoholism recovery. McGilchrist grounds moral psychology neurologically, showing that right-hemisphere function underwrites intention-based moral reasoning while left-hemisphere dominance produces utilitarian calculus, with full moral judgment requiring interhemispheric integration. Bernard Williams and Douglas Cairns bring the classical tradition to bear, demonstrating that Greek shame-culture articulates a moral psychology of honor, visibility, and internalized standards that predates and complicates the guilt-centered modern framework. Across all these voices, the corpus consistently refuses to reduce moral psychology to rational rule-following, insisting instead on affect, image, and unconscious process as the genuine substrata of ethical life.