Within the depth-psychology corpus, Materialism is not treated as a single, stable philosophical position but as a contested field of meanings whose boundaries shift depending on the context in which the term is deployed. At minimum, three distinct registers appear. The first is philosophical or scientific materialism — the ontological claim that matter is the sole substrate of reality, and that mind, consciousness, and soul are its epiphenomena. This position is subjected to sustained critique by Jung, McGilchrist, Hillman, and Aurobindo, each of whom regards it as a category error that forecloses inquiry into psychic and spiritual dimensions of existence. The second register is cultural or consumer materialism — the social valuation of things, possessions, and economic productivity over soul, meaning, and relationship. Moore, Sardello, and Trungpa address this form, the latter introducing the pivotal concept of ‘spiritual materialism,’ in which ego-reinforcement masquerades as spiritual practice. The third register, most distinctively Hillman’s, is methodological materialism — the epistemic habit of explaining psychological phenomena by reducing them to external causes, bodily processes, or prior events, a move he identifies as operative even within ostensibly depth-oriented practice. Across all three registers, materialism functions as a limiting horizon that the corpus consistently presses against, variously through phenomenological, metaphysical, spiritual, and clinical argument.