Language occupies a contested and generative position across the depth-psychology corpus. The passages gathered here reveal at least three distinct registers in which the term operates. In the structural-semiological tradition, Benveniste — drawing on and critically revising Saussure — treats language as the master semiological system: the irreducible interpretant of all other sign-systems, the medium in which society and individual subjectivity alike are constituted. For Benveniste, language is neither a transparent code nor a mere instrument; it is the site of enunciation, the irreversible act through which a speaker becomes a subject. McGilchrist approaches the term from neurological and phenomenological angles, arguing that language is neither necessary for thought nor for sophisticated communication, that its deepest roots lie in music and embodied emotion, and that its lateralization in the left hemisphere gives it a dominating, reductive relationship to lived experience. Abram, working phenomenologically after Merleau-Ponty, refuses to define language at all, treating it as an open bodily field woven by living speakers in exchange with the animate world. Derrida foregrounds the metaphysical entrapment within language, showing that categories of thought are merely transpositions of categories of language. Rank and Hillman attend to language at the level of expression and soul — its somatic origins, its capacity for deadening or for depth. Together these voices locate language at the intersection of body, sign, subjectivity, and world.