The judgment theory of emotion — the position that emotions are constituted by, or are identical with, evaluative judgments or cognitive appraisals — receives its most sustained treatment in the depth-psychology corpus through engagements with Stoic philosophy, particularly the Chrysippan thesis that passions (pathē) just are assents to evaluative impressions. Sorabji, Graver, Nussbaum, and Konstan collectively map both the power and the vulnerabilities of this view. Sorabji probes the theory’s edges by testing whether desire, rather than judgment, might be the more fundamental constituent of emotion, ultimately declining that route. Graver pursues the logical structure of the Stoic claim — that judgment is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the corresponding feeling — and tracks Posidonian objections that resemble modern cognitivist critiques. Nussbaum finds in Seneca’s dramatic art a literary demonstration that grief, love, and rage are inclinations of judgment itself, not antagonists of reason. Konstan situates the theory within Aristotle’s prior insistence that emotions alter judgment — an influence-direction that most post-Aristotelian cognitivists have neglected. Across these voices, a key tension persists: whether judgment is definitively constitutive of emotion, or whether imagination, attention, and non-rational powers play irreducibly independent causal roles. The stakes are therapeutic as much as theoretical, since Chrysippan therapy depends on the cogency of the identity thesis.
The identity of emotion with belief or judgment is in fact prominently stressed. Medea’s passions are not shown as coming from some part of her character to which the rational judging part is opposed.
Nussbaum reads Seneca’s Medea as an enacted demonstration of the Chrysippan judgment theory, in which emotions are inclinations of rational judgment itself, not forces opposed to it.
, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, 1994thesis
this opens up the possibility of trying to define emotion as a judgement of goodness and badness, coupled with a desire to react, rather than with a judgement approving reaction.
Sorabji examines whether emotion should be defined as a judgment of value paired with desire, ultimately finding this desire-based alternative unpersuasive as a general account.
, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 2000thesis
the judgments involved in emotion are sufficient conditions for the corresponding psychophysical changes, but not that they are necessary conditions.
Graver specifies the precise logical claim of the Stoic judgment theory: evaluative judgment suffices to produce emotion, but affective states may also occur without that judgment, undercutting a strict identity thesis.
, Stoicism and Emotion, 2007thesis
the beliefs or judgments that hooked up with emotion in the pre-Stoic tradition are judgments of value: cherishings and disvaluings of external uncontrolled items.
Nussbaum clarifies that the Stoic judgment theory requires specifically evaluative and eudaimonistic judgments — assessments of what matters to the agent’s flourishing — not merely cognitive beliefs.
, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, 1994thesis
When emotion occurs without the judgements, there will often be an appearance (phantasia), even though there is not an assent to turn the appearance into a judgement.
Sorabji reconstructs Posidonius’s challenge to the judgment theory by showing that emotion can occur at the level of appearance without assent, complicating the claim that judgment is constitutive.
, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 2000supporting
grief is identical with the acceptance of a proposition that is evaluative and eudaimonistic, that is, concerned with one or more of the person’s important goals and ends.
Konstan reports Nussbaum’s neo-Stoic formulation of the judgment theory, in which specific emotional states are identified with the acceptance of eudaimonistically evaluative propositions.
, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature, 2006supporting
Aristotle’s view that ‘we do not deliver judgments in the same way when we are grieving and rejoicing, or loving and hating.’
Konstan highlights Aristotle’s counter-directional thesis — that emotions alter judgment rather than being constituted by it — presenting a significant foil to the Stoic judgment theory.
, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature, 2006supporting
Beliefs, on their view, are relegated to a separate category: they impact on emotions as do emotions on beliefs, but they are not constitutive of emotion.
Konstan distinguishes Aristotle’s framework from cognitivist judgment theories by arguing that for Aristotle beliefs influence but do not constitute emotions, making judgment the effect rather than the essence.
, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature, 2006supporting
some bear a striking resemblance to points raised by modern theorists of emotion against the cognitivist analyses of Richard Lazarus and others.
Graver maps the ancient Posidonian objections to the Stoic judgment theory onto contemporary debates, linking Chrysippan cognitivism to modern appraisal theories and their critics.
, Stoicism and Emotion, 2007supporting
The Stoics’ analysis of emotions as value judgments, however, is independent of their controversial normative
Nussbaum notes that the Stoic judgment theory — the analysis of emotions as value judgments — can be evaluated independently of the Stoics’ normative ethics, establishing its philosophical autonomy.
, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, 1986supporting
there is no obvious subject-matter for one to assess as good or bad, or calling for reaction, and so no obvious subject-matter for the relevant judgements.
Sorabji uses the case of wordless music to probe whether genuine emotions require the evaluative judgments the theory demands, illustrating the theory’s dependence on identifiable propositional content.
, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, 2000supporting
people may be mistaken about the cause of an emotion. Indeed, people generally are consumed by the fear of death, a fear they either conceal or misrecognize.
Konstan notes the Epicurean observation that agents misidentify the objects of their emotions, implicitly challenging any judgment theory that requires accurate propositional content as constitutive of emotion.
, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature, 2006aside