Interpretance, as a technical term within the depth-psychology and semiological corpus, owes its most rigorous formulation to Émile Benveniste, whose 1968–1969 Collège de France lectures introduce it as a property uniquely belonging to language: the capacity of a semiological system to serve as its own interpretant and, more fundamentally, to interpret all other semiological systems. For Benveniste, ‘the language is always the interpretant’ — a claim that positions language not merely as one sign-system among others but as the meta-system through which all remaining systems (musical notation, gesture, image, ritual) receive intelligibility. The concept is explicitly distinguished from Peirce’s ‘interpretant’, which Benveniste borrows as an ‘isolated denomination’ while insisting on a different, phenomenological sense rooted in enunciation rather than in triadic logical relation. The tension between these two lineages — Peircean semiotics with its multiple, categorially refined interpretants, and Benvenistian semiology with its hierarchical, language-centred interpretance — constitutes the theoretical crux of the term. Within the depth-psychological register, the concept intersects with questions of how unconscious symbolic production (image, dream, symptom) requires linguistic enunciation for its integration, thereby shadowing the Lacanian claim that the unconscious is structured like a language. Interpretance thus marks the boundary between the mute symbolic and the speaking subject.