Interiority, as treated across the depth-psychological corpus, is not a simple spatial metaphor for what lies ‘inside’ the subject. It is, rather, a contested and philosophically charged concept whose meaning ranges from the imaginal privacy of psychic life (Hillman) to a rigorous logical structure constitutive of psychology itself (Giegerich), and from the biological topology of the living membrane (Simondon) to Hegel’s philosophical interiorization refracted through phenomenology (Derrida, Thompson). Hillman insists that the ‘in-ness’ of soul is imaginal and metaphorical, not literal or spatial — soul is not owned by the person but rather person exists within soul’s inhuman reaches. Giegerich radicalizes this: interiority is psychology’s proper discipline, but the interiority in question resides not in any subject but in psychology’s own Notion, which reflects all things through the mirror of its internal infinity. This move — absolute-negative Er-innerung, the interiorization of interiorization itself — distinguishes Giegerich’s logical psychology from both Hillman’s imaginal stance and conventional introspective models. Simondon, approaching from ontogenesis rather than hermeneutics, locates interiority at the threshold of living individuation: the membrane that polarizes interior from exterior is the structural condition for all vital processes. Taken together, these positions reveal a shared conviction that interiority cannot be literalized as a container, yet disagree profoundly about where it properly resides — in image, in Notion, or in process.