The term ‘infant’ functions in the depth-psychology corpus not merely as a developmental category but as a theoretical fulcrum upon which competing accounts of psychic origin, relational necessity, and constitutional endowment turn. Winnicott insists on the etymological precision of the word — infans, ‘not yet speaking’ — and treats the infant as constitutionally inseparable from maternal care, such that ‘the infant and the maternal care belong to each other and cannot be disentangled.’ For Winnicott, the infant is the site where true self and false self diverge, where continuity of being is either secured or ruptured by impingement. Klein positions the infant differently: as already inhabited by constitutional envy, greed, and destructive impulse, engaging from the earliest days with a part-object breast that is the locus of both gratitude and persecution. Fordham, via Samuels, conceives the infant as separate from the mother from the moment of conception, an active agent drawing maternal attention rather than a passive recipient of it. Schore reframes the infant neurobiologically, as a right-hemisphere organism whose limbic development is co-regulated through attuned dyadic gaze. Bowlby and the attachment theorists track the infant’s emergent capacity for object permanence and representational modelling. Across these positions, the infant marks the contested boundary between biology and relational environment, between constitutional fate and the possibility of therapeutic repair.