Homeric Mimesis occupies a pivotal and contested position within the depth-psychology corpus, functioning simultaneously as a technical term in ancient poetics, a theory of psychological identification, and a diagnosis of pre-philosophical consciousness. Havelock’s Preface to Plato furnishes the most sustained treatment, arguing that mimesis, as deployed by Plato against the Homeric tradition, names not abstract imitation but total psychosomatic re-enactment: poet and audience alike surrender individual selfhood to the performed tradition, engaging larynx, limb, and unconscious nervous system in an act of emotional identification. This reading transforms the Republic’s attack on poetry from aesthetic puritanism into a struggle over the very architecture of mind. Nagy’s work on rhapsodic performance corroborates the re-enactment model, showing how dramatic impersonation of Achilles or Odysseus moves along a continuum toward full cultic identification. Auerbach approaches the Homeric text from the opposite direction, characterizing its representational mode — uniform illumination, foreground externalization, uninterrupted presence — as a distinct realist style rather than a psychology of absorption. Jaynes introduces a neurological inflection, reading post-bicameral poetry as laborious mimesis of earlier divine utterance. Across these voices, tension persists between mimesis as dangerous ego-dissolution enabling oral mnemonics, and mimesis as a formal literary style whose psychological stakes are secondary to its representational logic.