The term ‘goal’ occupies a genuinely contested space within the depth-psychology corpus, where it functions simultaneously as therapeutic instrument, psychological phenomenon, and potential pathological fixation. The tradition divides, broadly, into two orientations. The first, represented by Hillman’s archetypal critique, treats the literal goal as a kind of psychic trap: goals are ‘thrown up by the psyche as bait,’ useful fictions that become dangerous when reified into ‘overvalued ideas’ feeding paranoid certainty. Here the living sense of purposefulness — what Adler called striving for perfection, Jung individuation — must be kept from collapsing into any fixed terminus. The second, represented by the clinical-behavioral tradition (Harris, Miller, Najavits), insists on goal specificity as a therapeutic necessity, distinguishing emotional goals from behavioral ones, dead persons’ goals from living persons’ goals, and informal goal-setting from SMART protocols. Van der Hart’s structural-dissociation framework adds a third register: goals as neurobiological organizers of perception-motor action cycles, disrupted by trauma and dissociation. Lench’s functional-emotion perspective situates goals as reference points against which pre- and post-goal emotional states are calibrated. Across these positions, the central tension is between goal as liberating direction and goal as imprisoning literalism — a tension that renders this term among the most theoretically charged in the clinical lexicon.