Embodied ethical reasoning designates the position, advanced most forcefully within the depth-psychological and neurobiological literature, that moral judgment is not a purely cerebral, rule-governed computation but depends constitutively upon feeling, somatic signalling, tacit knowledge, and the lived, intersubjective body. The corpus clusters around two converging axes. The first, represented principally by Antonio Damasio, is empirical and neurobiological: lesion studies of patients such as Phineas Gage and ‘Elliot’ demonstrate that destruction of prefrontal-limbic circuits abolishes the emotional markers that guide practical decision-making, leaving formal reasoning intact while rendering moral and personal choices catastrophically impaired. The somatic marker hypothesis thus grounds ethics in biology without reducing it to mere mechanism. The second axis, represented by Iain McGilchrist and, in a more classically philosophical register, Martha Nussbaum, is phenomenological and hermeneutical: moral perception is irreducibly contextual, requiring the whole embodied being — senses, feeling, imagination, and intuition — rather than explicit rule-following. McGilchrist’s neuroscientific argument that right-hemisphere suppression produces abnormally utilitarian judgments converges with Nussbaum’s Aristotelian insistence that practical wisdom resists codification. The central tension throughout is between rule-governed, disembodied rationalism and a view of ethical life as ineliminably dependent upon affective, bodily, and intersubjective attunement.