Distress occupies a richly contested position across the depth-psychology corpus, appearing simultaneously as a physiological signal, a philosophical category, a developmental marker, and a therapeutic target. The Stoic tradition, represented here by Sorabji and Graver, treats distress as a contraction of the soul arising from a mistaken judgement of evil — a cognitive event requiring rational correction rather than emotional suppression. The Philokalia tradition, by contrast, splits distress between soul and flesh, constructing a paradoxical ascetic economy in which distress in the senses is the necessary price of pleasure in the soul and vice versa, thereby rendering suffering spiritually productive. Developmental neuroscience, through Schore, maps distress onto early affect-regulatory systems, where the mother–infant dyad either resolves or encodes it as a template for later self-regulation. Somatic and trauma-oriented voices — Levine and Heller — position chronic distress as the residue of thwarted survival responses, generating the ‘distress cycle’ of dysregulation, dissociation, and compulsive adaptation. The DBT tradition (Scott) treats distress purely pragmatically: as an acute emotional state requiring tolerance skills, radical acceptance, and strategic distraction. Pargament situates distress within a coping matrix where religious resources function as modulators. Across these traditions, a persistent tension endures between distress as pathological disruption to be relieved and distress as constitutive, even generative, of psychological or spiritual development.