Within the depth-psychology corpus, the disease metaphor occupies a remarkable double position: it is simultaneously a diagnostic instrument and a cultural symptom. Ernest Kurtz traces its genealogy from biblical leprosy through Progressive Era tuberculosis to alcoholism and AIDS, arguing that each epoch selects a disease to embody its defining moral anxieties — contagion, stigma, and the boundary between self and society. Ruth Padel locates the roots of this metaphorical logic in Greek tragic and medical thought, where disease, passion, and pollution form a mutually reinforcing triad of dangerous intrusions upon the bounded self. James Hillman, characteristically, refuses to treat pathologizing as merely figurative: for him, the psyche’s productions of sickness are archetypal, not reducible to cultural assignment. Robert Sardello radicalizes the problem further, reading cancer and AIDS as literal crystallizations of a soul-depleted modernity. Gabor Maté challenges the possessive grammar of illness — ‘I have cancer’ — as itself a metaphor concealing the inseparability of person and process. Against the disease model of addiction, Marc Lewis employs the metaphor’s limitations diagnostically. David Sedgwick traces how Jungian clinical metaphor migrates from infection toward psychological vulnerability. The central tension across all positions is whether disease metaphors illuminate hidden truths about human existence or dangerously reify suffering as fixed, external, and morally charged.