The term ‘defence’ traverses the depth-psychology corpus along two broad axes that rarely converge without tension. The first is the metapsychological axis inaugurated by Freud and elaborated most systematically by Klein, Winnicott, Bowlby, and Kalsched: defence designates the psyche’s characteristic strategies for managing overwhelming affect, unbearable loss, or traumatic annihilation anxiety. Klein maps devaluation, dispersal of emotion, and flight to internal objects as defences against envy and loneliness; Winnicott identifies the ‘false self’ as a massive defensive organisation capable of social success while concealing psychic futility; Bowlby reconceives defence through cognitive-psychological language as the exclusion of information from further processing, and frames anxious attachment itself as a defensive compromise. Kalsched extends the concept furthest, proposing with Leopold Stein that the Self deploys archetypal defences that, when misfiring under trauma, produce auto-immune-like self-destruction. The second axis is ethical and literary: Adkins traces the role of legal defence in archaic Greek homicide proceedings; Snell contrasts Homeric ‘defence’ of the fatherland with the more aggressive martial glorification of Callinus and Tyrtaeus. These two axes illuminate a shared underlying problematic — the organism, whether psyche or polis, erecting barriers against an intruding other — and invite comparison across clinical and cultural registers that the corpus only partially undertakes.