Deconstruction enters the depth-psychology corpus as a term of considerable ambivalence, drawn from Derrida’s philosophical project yet pressed into service by clinicians, phenomenologists, and post-Jungian theorists for purposes that both extend and resist its original impulse. At one pole, Romanyshyn reads deconstruction through the alchemical lens of mortification and nigredo, treating it as a hermeneutical ally for research that demands ego-dissolution and the relinquishing of narcissistic attachment to one’s own work. At another pole, Giegerich mounts a sustained critique: while acknowledging the surface similarity between Derrida’s axiom that ‘there is nothing outside the text’ and depth psychology’s insistence that the image is self-sufficient, he argues that Derrida’s commitment to the written gramme forecloses the staking of the whole self that genuine psychological thinking requires. Frank employs the term in a more sociological register, analyzing medicine’s ‘deconstruction of mortality’ as the reduction of existential terror into manageable clinical puzzles—a process that is at once practically useful and spiritually evasive. Stein invokes it as a diagnostic label for the dissolution of Western cultural coherence, the collective liminality from which new integrating images must emerge. Derrida himself, in the Margins of Philosophy, frames deconstruction as a strategic choice within a system that converts every apparent exit into a ‘false exit.’ The corpus thus presents deconstruction as simultaneously a philosophical method, a cultural diagnosis, a hermeneutical practice, and a target of rigorous critique.