The depth-psychology corpus engages ‘Competitive Excellence’ along two distinct but intersecting axes: the archaic Greek valorisation of *aretē* as agonistic supremacy, and the modern psychological interrogation of what drives, sustains, or pathologises the pursuit of surpassing performance. In the Homeric and lyric traditions examined by Adkins, Sullivan, Cairns, and Nagy, competitive excellence is the foundational social good — constituted by visible results rather than intentions, ratified through public contest, and inseparable from honour (*timē*) and shame (*aidōs*). Adkins’s landmark distinction between ‘competitive excellences’ and ‘co-operative excellences’ exposes the structural tension: Homeric society privileges the former because collective survival depends on martial and strategic superiority, whereas quieter virtues remain subordinate until Platonic and Aristotelian reform begins to revalue them. Sullivan traces this evolution through Pindar, who insists that inborn capacity must be trained and divinely favoured to become genuine *aretē*. Ricoeur brings the concept into MacIntyre’s framework of ‘standards of excellence’ as socially constituted and cooperatively maintained benchmarks. Lench’s emotion-science perspective offers a complementary analysis: excellence triggers pride, admiration, and moral elevation — emotions that serve both agentic (getting ahead) and communal (getting along) functions. Horney’s critical voice sounds a cautionary note, diagnosing compulsive competitive drives as neurotic phantoms of glory that leave inner distress untouched. Hillman’s archetypal lens frames competitive notions of inspired action as culturally distorting forces that eclipse the societal and soul-serving dimension of excellence.
In comparison with the competitive excellences, the quieter co-operative excellences must take an inferior position; for it is not evident at this time that the security of the group depends to any large extent upon these excellences.
Adkins argues that Homeric society structurally subordinates cooperative virtues to competitive excellences because martial supremacy, not communal morality, underwrites collective survival.
, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values, 1960thesis
Excellences, competitive, see Values, competitive. Excellences, co-operative, see Values, co-operative.
Adkins’s index entry formally canonises the distinction between competitive and co-operative excellences as the organising polarity of his entire study of Greek moral values.
, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values, 1960thesis
Standards of excellence are rules of comparison applied to different accomplishments, in relation to ideals of perfection shared by a given community of practitioners and internalized by the masters and virtuosi of the practice considered.
Ricoeur, following MacIntyre, reframes competitive excellence as socially constituted standards that resist solipsistic self-esteem and are sustained through cooperative, historically embedded practices.
, Oneself as Another, 1992thesis
Excellence contexts provide the opportunity to get along and get ahead — an opportunity that is cued by and indeed realized by the positive emotions of pride, admiration, and moral elevation.
Lench argues that excellence — understood as surpassing merit in skill or virtue — simultaneously elicits emotions serving both competitive advancement and communal solidarity.
, The Function of Emotions: When and Why Emotions Help Us, 2018thesis
An individual has great power by inborn valour. But the one who has only teachings dwells ever in darkness, attracted to one thing at one time, another at another, and never walks with a sure step.
Sullivan shows Pindar insisting that competitive excellence requires an irreducible inborn substrate that training alone cannot supply, establishing nature as the precondition of agonistic achievement.
, Psychological and Ethical Ideas What Early Greeks Say, 1995thesis
Thought, then, must be taken not only for the winning of arete but also for the manner of keeping it. ‘Respect for forethought casts arete and joys upon human beings’.
Sullivan’s reading of Pindar establishes that competitive excellence is not merely achieved but must be maintained through proper attitude — avoiding pride and acknowledging divine gift.
, Psychological and Ethical Ideas What Early Greeks Say, 1995thesis
The whole pursuit of success is intrinsically unrealistic. Since we live in a competitive culture, these remarks may sound strange or unworldly.
Horney interprets compulsive competitive striving as a neurotic pursuit of glory that fails to resolve the inner distress motivating it, exposing competitive excellence as a cultural ideology masking psychological futility.
, Neurosis and Human Growth: The Struggle Toward Self-Realization, 1950thesis
In practice the Greeks associated it more with areion, meaning ‘better’, and with aristos, meaning ‘best’. The position of excellence within an agonistic, comparative frame was thus etymologically grounded.
Sullivan’s etymological analysis reveals that Greek *aretē* was structurally comparative from its origins, embedding competitive superiority within the very concept of excellence.
, Psychological and Ethical Ideas What Early Greeks Say, 1995supporting
If someone were to win a victory by swiftness of feet or in the pentathlon… he would be full of glory for the citizens to gaze upon, and he would win a conspicuous front seat at festivals.
Sullivan’s citation of Xenophanes captures the civic dimension of competitive athletic excellence — victory confers visible, institutionally ratified social honour.
, Psychological and Ethical Ideas What Early Greeks Say, 1995supporting
Excellence clearly is a potent elicitor of emotional experience. When it is oneself that achieves excellence, pride can arise. When another person achieves excellence, moral elevation can arise when that excellence is virtuous in nature.
Lench distinguishes the differential emotional responses to one’s own versus another’s excellence, mapping the functional emotion-architecture that competitive and moral achievement respectively activate.
, The Function of Emotions: When and Why Emotions Help Us, 2018supporting
The co-operative excellences have become aretai, and hence desirable, without the necessity of adopting the ‘logic’ of words commending success and decrying failure.
Adkins traces the historical moment in fourth-century Greek thought when cooperative virtues achieved the status of *aretai*, partially displacing the exclusive primacy of competitive excellence.
, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values, 1960supporting
Brave action in battle attracts notice. It illustrates what is splendid in the fighter and… if escaping from this battle we would be always ageless and immortal, neither would I myself fight among the first ranks.
Sullivan shows that Homeric competitive excellence is existentially grounded: mortality itself compels the hero to distinguish himself through agonistic action that will outlast death.
, Psychological and Ethical Ideas What Early Greeks Say, 1995supporting
Achieving a promotion can elicit pride, whereas the success of a colleague can elicit admiration. Moreover, employees can experience group-level pride in relation to the organization that employs them.
Lench extends the excellence-emotion framework to the workplace, demonstrating that competitive and collective forms of excellence generate distinct emotional trajectories within institutional settings.
, The Function of Emotions: When and Why Emotions Help Us, 2018supporting
Our civilization’s egocentric, competitive notions of inspired actions make us miss their societal service. ‘Inspiration’ means simply ‘inbreathing of spirit,’ not ‘exaltation of the spirited.’
Hillman critiques modern competitive excellence as an egocentric distortion that severs inspired achievement from its properly archetypal, community-serving function.
, The Soul’s Code: In Search of Character and Calling, 1996supporting
Morally elevated individuals not only seek moral excellence but are also less tolerant of others who fail to act with moral excellence.
Lench identifies a normative consequence of moral excellence: those elevated by witnessing it adopt stricter standards toward others, linking competitive moral striving to social regulation.
, The Function of Emotions: When and Why Emotions Help Us, 2018supporting
Pride stemming from prior moral excellence prompts outcomes associated with communal warmth.
Lench qualifies pride’s socially divisive potential by showing that when pride is rooted in moral rather than merely competitive excellence, it generates affiliative rather than distancing outcomes.
, The Function of Emotions: When and Why Emotions Help Us, 2018supporting
Agathos and arete were reckoned by results rather than intentions, and reasons were given for this. The attitude, together with the reasons, still holds.
Adkins establishes that across centuries of Greek literature, competitive excellence remained outcome-indexed — internal intention carried no independent moral weight against visible achievement or failure.
, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values, 1960supporting
These early Greeks believe that no human being could ever be capable of splendid behaviour on the basis of birth alone. Training, education, and guidance over a period of time was always necessary.
Sullivan synthesises the early Greek developmental model of excellence: innate capacity is necessary but never sufficient — disciplined cultivation always mediates the emergence of genuine competitive excellence.
, Psychological and Ethical Ideas What Early Greeks Say, 1995supporting
As our nation anxiously obsesses over competitive productivity, as we aim to become more lean and more mean, our ideas of power have been shaped to conform with this dominating anxiety. Power must be productive and productivity must be heroic.
Hillman critiques the cultural fusion of competitive excellence with heroic productivity, arguing that this amalgam reflects an anxiety-driven rather than soul-serving conception of power.
, Kinds of Power: A Guide to Its Intelligent Uses, 1995supporting
It is reasonable to expect, in Athens above all, the emergence of a new kind of arete — a use, that is, of the highest term of value to commend a new kind of activity.
Adkins traces how competitive excellence historically expanded its domain — from martial prowess to political and intellectual skill — as Athenian society confronted new forms of socially valued performance.
, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values, 1960supporting
Aidos, even if conceived as a mere preliminary to complete arete, cannot simply be regarded as a fear of the unpleasant consequences of ill-repute and is thus not incompatible with a form of conscience based on internalized moral standards.
Cairns situates *aidōs* as a moral precondition for full excellence, showing that the shame-complex is not reducible to competitive fear of dishonour but involves genuinely internalised ethical standards.
, Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature, 1993aside
Family members, teachers, and the general atmosphere in our society encourage us to excel, to succeed, to prove our competence in a competitive world.
Grof identifies socially enforced competitive achievement orientation as a form of misdirected spiritual thirst — the drive to excel becomes a substitute for genuine inner wholeness.
, The Thirst for Wholeness: Attachment, Addiction, and the Spiritual Path, 1993aside