Cognitive Therapy occupies a contested but consequential position within the depth-psychology corpus, appearing variously as a complementary technique, a theoretical rival, and an empirical touchstone against which other modalities measure themselves. The corpus reveals three distinct lines of engagement. First, cognitive therapy is positioned as a methodology of belief-modification whose core mechanism — what Najavits terms ‘empirical hypothesis testing’ or ‘discovery’ — distinguishes it sharply from mere persuasion or didactic instruction; the therapist guides patients toward testing their own assumptions rather than receiving new ones. Second, authors such as Bowlby’s commentators locate cognitive therapy in explicit dialogue with psychoanalytic and attachment traditions, noting structural echoes between Beck’s hierarchy of expectations and Bowlbian internal working models, while insisting on the primordial difference: cognitions are treated as causally primary over emotions. Third, LeDoux and the neurobiological wing interrogate the neural substrates underlying cognitive change, situating the modification of maladaptive beliefs within circuits of working memory, executive control, and extinction — thereby both validating and circumscribing cognitive therapy’s reach. Across trauma literatures (Lanius, Courtois, van der Kolk), cognitive therapy appears primarily as cognitive-behavioral therapy, evaluated through randomized trial evidence and judged efficacious yet incomplete for complex presentations. The perennial tension is between top-down cognitive restructuring and bottom-up somatic or relational approaches.