Body sensation occupies a pivotal position across the depth-psychology corpus, functioning simultaneously as raw physiological datum, therapeutic instrument, and primary medium through which trauma is encoded and released. The literature divides broadly into three orientations. The first, exemplified by Ogden’s sensorimotor psychotherapy, treats body sensation as a distinct ‘building block’ of present experience that must be linguistically differentiated from emotion, cognition, and movement before effective therapeutic processing can occur — a methodological insistence that reflects the field’s hard-won clinical insight that sensation and affect, though co-arising, require separate tracking lest their conflation escalate dysregulation. The second orientation, represented by Craig, Damasio, and Fogel, grounds body sensation neurobiologically in interoceptive pathways — lamina I spinothalamic projections, insular cortex, and the continuous visceral reporting that underwrites consciousness — arguing that what we call ‘feelings’ are essentially cortical representations of ongoing somatic states. Levine’s somatic experiencing tradition bridges these registers, proposing that the ‘felt sense’ — a holistic, pre-verbal body sensation — carries the key to trauma resolution precisely because it operates below narrative cognition. A persistent tension runs through all positions: whether body sensation is a therapeutic target to be cultivated and vocabularized, or a pre-reflective ground that analytic attention risks disturbing. Jung’s dissenting note — that psychological sensation as a typological function is entirely distinct from bodily sensations — marks the conceptual border that contemporary somatic clinicians have largely, and deliberately, crossed.