Benevolence occupies a contested and philosophically charged position across the depth-psychology corpus. It appears not as a simple virtue but as a term under sustained interrogation: its authenticity, its psychological roots, its potential for self-deception, and its relationship to deeper orders of moral life are all in question. Zhuangzi’s dialogues, as rendered by Watson, supply the sharpest challenge: ‘perfect benevolence knows no affection,’ suggesting that conventional benevolence — warm, emotionally bonded, particularistic — is itself a lesser form, even a corruption, of what genuine moral excellence might be. Zhuangzi further warns that benevolence practiced as social currency becomes ‘at best a form of insincerity, at worst a deliberate lending of weapons to the evil.’ William James, by contrast, recuperates benevolence as the saint’s creative social energy — charity that ‘regenerates its objects’ and transcends mere worldly prudence. The Daoist-Confucian debate over whether benevolence (ren) represents a falling away from natural Virtue or a necessary stage in moral cultivation runs through multiple passages. The Aurora Consurgens introduces benignitas as a theological virtue that ‘renders good for evil.’ The convergent tension — whether benevolence is authentic, inauthentic, transcendent, or corrosive — marks it as one of the corpus’s most generative ethical fault lines.