Aristotle stands as one of the foundational presences in the depth-psychology corpus, appearing not as a static authority but as a living theoretical resource whose doctrines on soul, desire, imagination, and emotion are continually interrogated, appropriated, and contested. The corpus engages Aristotle along several distinct axes. First, his hylomorphic psychology — the soul as the form of a living body — is treated as a bold and genuinely scientific intervention that refuses both Platonic dualism and crude materialism, opening philosophical space for a naturalistic account of animate life that modern psychologists have found generative. Second, his accounts of desire (orexis), phantasia, and the mechanics of motivation attract sustained attention from scholars of Stoicism and Greek ethics, who read Aristotle as establishing the structural dualism between rational and animal selfhood that Stoic philosophy would later attempt to dissolve. Third, his analyses of the emotions — anger, pity, shame, fear — as presented in the Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics provide the primary ancient taxonomy against which later moral-psychological literature defines itself. Finally, Nussbaum’s engagement positions Aristotle as the philosopher who rehabilitates human vulnerability and the phenomenological appearances (phainomena) against Platonic transcendence. The tensions that animate these readings — between form and matter, reason and appetite, scientific rigor and moral anthropocentrism — make Aristotle indispensable to any depth-psychological reckoning with the ancient world.