The apophasis of mental images — the negative movement that strips, negates, or sublates the image as a cognitive and psychological vehicle — occupies an unresolved tension across the depth-psychology corpus. The term names a practice and a problem: the deliberate refusal to rest in the image as terminus, treating imaginal content not as destination but as something that must undo itself in order to release what it carries. Wolfgang Giegerich prosecutes this most rigorously, arguing that archetypal and imaginal psychology halt precisely where soul-work demands continuation — at the frozen image — failing to press through the image toward what he calls the soul’s logical life. For Giegerich, images must be sublated, not venerated; they are necessary scaffolding that must eventually decompose from within. James Hillman, by contrast, insists on dwelling within the image, finding in its autonomous life the very currency of soul. John Welwood, drawing on contemplative epistemology, raises the question of whether a self constituted by self-representations can possess genuine reality, pointing toward an awareness that bypasses images altogether. Antonio Damasio, from the neuroscientific side, treats mental images as the fundamental substrate of mind itself, making their negation cognitively inconceivable. The tension between Giegerich’s logical sublation and Hillman’s imaginal fidelity defines the central axis of this term’s significance in the contemporary depth-psychological literature.