Animism occupies a contested and generative position within the depth-psychology corpus, functioning simultaneously as an anthropological category, a developmental stage of psychic life, and a living mode of world-participation that resists reduction to mere projection. Freud, drawing on Tylor, Wundt, and Spencer, treated animism as the first of three great cosmological systems — animism, religion, science — and located it phylogenetically in a narcissistic stage of libidinal organization, wherein the infant or primitive mind peoples an undifferentiated world with emanations of its own emotional cathexes. For Jung and his successors such as Edinger, animism marks the earliest stratum of the collective unconscious still operative in the individual psyche: the ‘animistic phase of religion’ in which psychic energy is experienced as residing in trees, animals, and spirits rather than as an interior force owned by an individuated ego. Hillman, by contrast, rehabilitates animism as the soul’s native tendency to personify — the ground of anthropomorphism, poetry, and mythic imagination — while Sardello explicitly rejects the projection-theory embedded in the anthropological definition, insisting that soul inheres in the world and is not cast upon it from within. McGilchrist allies animism with panentheism as a right-hemispheric intuition rather than a cognitive error, citing Ingold’s ethnographic revision that animism is not a belief system at all but a mode of attentiveness. Harrison, Burkert, and Otto trace animism’s conceptual borders against animatism, pre-animism, and mana, while Abram phenomenologically recovers animistic perception through embodied sensory encounter with a more-than-human world. The term thus spans naive projection and sophisticated ontology, archaic regression and post-modern ecology.